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THE BATTLE OF THE VERBS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S 
RECONCILIATION OF “VERBING” WITH TRADEMARK LAW AND 
PRACTICES 
Taylor Carrere* 
In its recent decision in Elliot v. Google, the Ninth Circuit 
reinforced Google’s trademark significance against claims that the 
mark “google” should be canceled under the Lanham Act due to the 
public’s verb usage of the trademark. The public’s “verbing” of 
popular marks has become a particularly onerous problem for 
internet and technology trademark owners like Google, who want to 
encourage their products’ integration into pop culture while still 
maintaining control of their mark. The court’s holding that evidence 
of verb usage, without more, is not sufficient to prove that the 
trademark has succumbed to genericide is a step in the right 
direction in reconciling older trademark practices with modern 
language use and the evolving realities of internet marketing. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Even though the verb “google” has only recently been 
introduced into the English language,1 most people would probably 
understand a person stating they “googled something” to mean that 
they used an internet’s search engine to learn more about a subject. 
It would not be unusual to overhear one friend saying to another, “I 
googled the long-term effects of eating those carbs. It’s not good.” 
The listening friend will likely understand that when her friend says 
she has “googled” carbs, she means that she has researched on the 
internet how bad carbs are for her. Although using the word 
“google” in this way has become second nature to the public, 
Google2 has spent years3 reminding people that “google” is not just 
                                               
 1 Google, Inc. was founded in 1998, and the term “google” was not filed for 
trademark protection until 1999, making the word about technology services less 
than twenty years old. See Our Story: From the Garage to the Googleplex, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/intl/en/about/our-story/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2017); see 
also United States Patent and Trademark Office, reg. nos. 2884502 and 2806075, 
http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=toc&state=4803%3At08erp.2.151 (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2017). 
 2 Google is now a subsidiary of a larger company called Alphabet, but this paper 
continues to refer to Google as the company which owns the trademark to be 
consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s usage in Elliot v. Google, Inc. 860 F.3d 1151 
(9th Cir. 2017), which began before the company became part of the larger 
corporation in October of 2015. Further, the Google search engine is still under 
the Google umbrella of the company. See Avery Hartman, Here Are All the 
Companies and Divisions within Alphabet, Google’s Parent Company, BUS. 






 3 Suzanne Choney, No Googling, Says Google–Unless You Really Mean It, 
NBC NEWS (Mar. 26, 2013, 3:43 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/technolog/no-
googling-says-google-unless-you-really-mean-it-1C9078566 (detailing some of 
the lengths Google has gone to since 2006 to ensure that those using its brand as 
a verb do so in specific reference to the Google search engine). 
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something you do on the internet. First and foremost, it is a 
trademark—and an extremely valuable one at that.4 
Ironically, a trademark’s transition from noun to verb signifies 
not only that the trademark has been successfully integrated into the 
minds of consumers, but also that it may be on its way to the generic 
graveyard.5 Genericide occurs when a valid trademark evolves from 
being used for identifying a single product under a brand name to 
representing an entire category of products not connected to the 
brand.6 Once a mark loses its ability to signify the source of the good 
or product being sold, it no longer qualifies for trademark 
protection.7 Other brands have already fallen victim to genericide, 
and few people, if any, remember that terms such as “trampoline,” 
“escalator,” and “aspirin” were initially trademark-protected 
brands.8 Over time, these terms became generic because they came 
to signify the product, rather than the producer, in the public’s 
mind.9 
For the past five years, Google has been engaged in extensive 
litigation to protect its trademark against allegations brought by 
Chris Gillespie and David Elliot, who wanted to use the mark in 
their own trademark registrations as part of an academic 
experiment.10 Gillespie and Elliot argued that the term “google” was 
                                               
 4 Rami S. Yanni, Genericization of a Giant: Has the World’s Most Valuable 




 5 Scott Brown, “I Tweeted on Facebook Today:” Re-Evaluating Trademark 
Genericide of Internet-based Trademarks, 7 J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 457, 482 
(2012). 
 6 Id. at 460. 
 7 Id. 
8 Mary Beth Quirk, 15 Product Trademarks That Have Become Victims of 
Genericization, CONSUMERIST (May 16, 2017, 3:36 PM), 
https://consumerist.com/201 
 9 Id. 
 10 Mary Beth Quirk, Google Avoids Genericide, Will Remain a Protected 
Trademark, CONSUMERIST (May 16, 2017, 3:58 PM), 
https://consumerist.com/2017/05/16/google-avoids-genericide-will-remain-a-
protected-trademark/; see also Yanni, supra note 4 (explaining that Gillespie, who 
originally registered the 763 domain names, claimed he was doing so as part of 
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generic because the majority of the public understood the term, 
when used as a verb, to mean to search for information on the 
internet.11 Because generic trademarks cannot be given trademark 
protection,12 Gillespie and Elliot argued that they should be allowed 
to incorporate the term into their business plans.13 After this 
argument was rejected by the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”) 
and the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, 
Gillespie and Elliot appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, 
which decided the case in May of 2017.14 
This Recent Development argues the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Elliot v. Google, Inc.—that verb usage of a trademark does not 
necessitate its death by genericide—is an accurate and important 
step in reconciling trademark law with modern language practices 
and internet marketing. It progresses in four parts. Part II explains 
the legal backdrop of the genericide problem by detailing the 
Lanham Act and the genericide doctrine.15 It also explains the 
linguistic concept of “verbing” and the effects it has on trademark 
law and practices. Part III presents the background for the Ninth 
Circuit’s recent decision in Elliot v. Google, Inc. which upheld 
Google’s trademark against a Lanham Act petition that sought to 
cancel the trademark.16 Part IV discusses how the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision accurately reflects the goals of trademark law and 
acknowledges the evolution of language and internet marketing 
realities and discusses possible revisions to trademark law to better 
reflect these new realities. 
                                               
an academic expert to test a computer program he designed to prevent cyber 
piracy). 
 11 Yanni, supra note 4. 
 12 Brown, supra note 5, at 460. 
 13 Yanni, supra note 4. 
 14 Elliott v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 15 Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism 
Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2007). 
 16 Elliot, 860 F.3d at 1163. 
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II. THE LEGAL BACKDROP 
A. Lanham Act and the Genericide Doctrine 
A trademark term falls into one of five basic classifications.17 
These classifications act as a sliding scale, which courts use to 
determine the amount of protection a trademark is given.18 At one 
end of this scale, fanciful or arbitrary marks are considered to be the 
strongest type of trademarks and, thus, receive the most protection 
under both the common law and the Lanham Act.19 Fanciful marks, 
such as “Google” and “Xerox,” are usually words invented solely 
for the purpose of being used as trademarks; therefore, they have no 
connection to common words used prior to their invention.20 
At the other end of the scale, generic words garner no protection 
because “they do not (or no longer) have the capacity for source 
identification.”21 Without being able to distinguish the goods or 
services for which the trademark represents, generic trademarks do 
not serve one of the basic goals of trademark law: to protect 
consumers from deceptive and confusing trade names by enabling 
them to purchase a product they trust.22 
The Lanham Act, first passed in 1946, provides trademark 
owners with significantly more rights than were guaranteed under 
either the common law or the previous Trademark Act of 1905.23 
                                               
 17 Desai & Rierson, supra note 15, at 1805 (listing the five categories of 
trademark status as arbitrary, fanciful, suggestive, descriptive, and generic). The 
Ninth Circuit combines arbitrary and fanciful terms into one category to recognize 
four categories of trademark protections. Elliot, 860 F.3d at 1155. Because both 
arbitrary and fanciful marks earn the same degree of trademark protection, this 
distinction holds no real significance for the purposes of this article. 
 18 Desai & Rierson, supra note 15, at 1805. 
 19 Id. at 1805, 1809. 
 20 Id. at 1807. 
 21 Id. at 1809. For example, “Apple” cannot be a trademark for a produce 
company that grows apples because it is a generic name for the good that the 
company supplies. However, it can be used as a trademark for a computer 
company. Thus, the ability to register and protect a trademark is fact-specific. 
Brown, supra note 5, at 460. 
 22 Brown, supra note 5, at 477–78. 
 23 Desai & Rierson, supra note 15, at 1815 (explaining that under the common 
law, the first user of a trademark could only obtain priority in the geographic 
locations in which his or her mark had gained “goodwill”). 
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The Act expanded the types of marks that qualify for federal 
trademark protection and eliminated geographical restrictions on 
these protections.24 The Lanham Act also provides for a cause of 
action to cancel trademarks that have fallen to generic use.25 
Specifically, the Act allows a petition to cancel a trademark to be 
made at “any time if the registered mark becomes the generic name 
for the goods or services, or a portion thereof, for which it is 
registered.”26 The Act further states: 
If the registered mark becomes the generic name for less than all the 
goods or services for which it is registered, a petition to cancel the 
registration for only those goods or services may be filed. A registered 
mark shall not be deemed to be the generic name of goods or services 
solely because such mark is also used as a name of or to identify a unique 
product or service. The primary significance of the registered mark to the 
relevant public rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test for 
determining whether the registered mark has become the generic name 
of goods or services on or in connection with which it has been used.27 
Thus, the current version of the Lanham Act extends no protection 
to generic words or terms and considers them to be abandoned and 
invalid.28 
Genericide refers to “the process by which a mark that was once 
highly valuable and unquestionably protectable loses all trademark 
status and value.”29 To determine whether a trademark is susceptible 
to genericide, courts use the primary significance test codified in the 
Act and articulated by the Supreme Court in Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l 
                                               
 24 Id. at 1815–16. 
 25 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Sandra L. Rierson, Toward a More Coherent Doctrine of Trademark 
Genericism and Functionality: Focusing on Fair Competition, 27 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 691, 701 (2017) (“The current version of the 
Lanham Act extends no protection to words or terms considered generic, even if 
the word or term was, at one point, a registered inherently distinctive trademark. 
The Act codifies the doctrine of genericide by stating that, if a mark becomes ‘the 
generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used,’ 
for any reason, it is considered abandoned and is no longer a valid trademark.”). 
 29 Desai & Rierson, supra note 15, at 1790. 
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Biscuit Co.30 In Kellogg Co., the Supreme Court held that a company 
could not claim trademark protection for the term “shredded wheat” 
merely because it had a secondary meaning that was associated with 
its particular product.31 Rather, the company had to show that “the 
primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming 
public [was] not the product but the producer.”32 
Some circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, have attempted to 
refine the primary significance test by relying upon the “who-are-
you/what-are-you” test.33 A trademark protected term will answer 
the question, “who are you?,” while a generic term will answer the 
question, “what are you?”34 For example, if asked to give the 
significance of the term “trampoline,” one would likely explain that 
it is a recreational device that one jumps on. The term “trampoline,” 
therefore, answers the question “what is it?” rather than “who is it?” 
because the answer involves explaining what the product does rather 
than who produces it. On the other hand, if asked to give the 
significance of the term “Samsung,” one would likely explain that it 
is a brand of electronics and appliances. Because the answer 
identifies the term with the producer rather than the product, the 
term “Samsung” answers the question “who is it?” and would be 
considered a valid trademark under the primary significance test. 
In an attempt to answer these questions, courts examine 
evidence of the trademark’s use in a variety of situations.35 The 
burden is on the examining attorney to prove by clear evidence that 
the mark is generic; this evidence can be taken from any competent 
source that demonstrates the public’s primary understanding of the 
term.36 This often includes evidence of the mark’s use in commercial 
settings—such as competitors’ use of the mark, the trademark 
                                               
 30 Rierson, supra note 28, at 702–03; see also Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 
305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938). 
 31 Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 118. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Desai, supra note 15, at 1825. 
 34 Brown, supra note 5, at 461. 
 35 Id. at 462. 
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holder’s use of the mark, testimony of members of the trade, and—
finally—surveys.37 
Surveys are one of the most common forms of evidence offered 
to prove a mark’s generic nature and are commonly used by courts 
making genericide determinations.38 Modern genericide surveys 
trace their origins to two seminal cases that employed significantly 
different surveys in order to determine whether the trademarks in 
question were indeed generic.39 The first, which will be discussed 
later in this section, came from King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin 
Indus., Inc.40 This “Thermos Survey,” as it has become commonly 
known, consists of a series of open-ended questions aimed at 
discerning how the consumer would ask for or describe a product in 
order to determine if the trademark has become a generic name for 
that product.41 
The second, commonly known as a “Teflon Survey,” employs 
mostly close-ended questions in order to determine whether a mark 
is a brand name or a common name.42 This survey technique 
originates from the case E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida 
Int’l, Inc.,43 in which the plaintiff, Du Pont, conducted a survey 
hoping to contradict evidence that its trademark, TEFLON, had 
become a generic term for the non-stick coating on pots and pans.44 
Du Pont started the survey by explaining the difference between 
“brand names” and “common names.”45 Once assured that the 
respondents understood this distinction, Du Pont then read a list of 
eight words, including the disputed trademark, to the respondents 
and had them answer whether they thought the word was a brand 
name or a common name.46 Teflon Surveys have now become the 
                                               
 37 Brown, supra note 5, at 463. 
 38 E. Deborah Jay, Genericness Surveys in Trademark Disputes: Evolution of a 
Species, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 1118, 1119 (2009). 
 39 Id. at 1122. 
 40 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963). 
 41 Jay, supra note 38, at 1122, 1124. 
 42 Id. at 1122. 
 43 393 F. Supp. 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). 
 44 Jay, supra note 38, at 1125. 
 45 Id. at 1126. 
 46 Id. 
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preferred survey method by courts attempting to establish the 
trademark’s significance.47 
In addition to considering evidence of commercial uses of the 
trademark, courts also look at evidence of the public’s non-
commercial uses, such as dictionary and media use of the trademark, 
to determine whether the mark is generic48 despite the fact that 
trademark holders have no legal right to control non-commercial 
uses of their marks.49 Courts take non-commercial uses into 
consideration based on the idea that they have the potential to show 
the primary significance of the mark to the public.50 As the Second 
Circuit noted, “[t]hough not conclusive, dictionary definitions of a 
word to denote a category of products are significant evidence of 
genericness because they usually reflect the public’s perception of a 
word’s meaning and its contemporary usage.”51 The same rationale 
applies to courts’ considerations of media and non-trade magazines’ 
uses of the trademark.52 Because of the circumstantial nature of this 
kind of evidence, courts usually require additional evidence to 
corroborate the idea that the trademark has become generic.53 
B. Verbing and Its Effect on Trademark Law 
Modern English speakers are certainly familiar with 
nominalizations of verbs, as the English language is full of words 
                                               
 47 Id. at 1131. 
 48 Brown, supra note 5, at 464. 
 49 Desai & Rierson, supra note 15, at 1835. 
 50 Vanessa Bowman Pierce, If It Walks and Quacks Like a Duck, Shouldn’t It 
be a Duck?: How a “Functional” Approach Ameliorates the Discontinuity 
Between the “Primary Significance” Tests for Genericness and Secondary 
Meaning, 37 N.M. L. REV. 147, 160–61 (2007). 
 51 Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grotanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 810 (2d. Cir. 1999). 
 52 Jessica E. Lanier, Effective Policing: Giving Trademark Holders a Pre-
Emptive Against “Genericide”, 20 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 247, 257–58 (2014). 
 53 Brown, supra note 5, at 464. As Pierce notes, however, dictionary entries and 
other non-trade publications do not necessarily demonstrate that a trademark is 
used generically by the public at the time of their publication, but, rather, cause a 
trademark to be seen as generic by their readers. In short, they may not reflect a 
term’s generic nature so much as cause it to become generic. Pierce, supra note 
50, at 160–61. 
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that were once verbs and have become nouns.54 Traditional 
nominalizations, such as the words “acceleration” and 
“intimidation,” have obvious roots in their verb counterparts, but 
English speakers have recently become even more transparent in 
their use of nominalizations by foregoing the alteration of the verbs 
and, instead, using their verb form as nouns.55 “Hey, I like your 
build,” is an example of the latter.56 
Although the opposite of nominalization, verbing, may seem 
like a more recent phenomenon, it has actually been around for 
centuries, with some of the best known historical examples coming 
from William Shakespeare’s plays.57 In Shakespeare’s historical 
play, Richard II, the Duke of York tells young Henry Bolingbroke 
(soon to be Henry IV of England) who has returned from exile 
without the king’s permission, “Grace me no grace, nor uncle me no 
uncle/ I am no traitor’s uncle”58 With this turn of phrase, the Duke 
of York has turned the honorary titles “your grace” and “uncle” into 
verbs in order to express his disgust at his nephew’s disregard of his 
and the king’s authority. The verbing that is so well employed here 
by Shakespeare has now become a ubiquitous part of our everyday 
conversations, so much so that even the Oxford Dictionary has 
recognized some of these verbified nouns.59 
Although versatility is undoubtedly a strength of the English 
language, it also poses problems for trademark owners who are 
taught never to allow their brand to be used as nouns or verbs. What 
may be even more problematic for trademark owners than the 
American public’s tendency toward nominalization is the public’s 
growing fascination with “verbing.”60 “Defined, verbing is the 
                                               
 54 Henry Hitchings, Those Irritating Verbs-as-Nouns, N.Y. TIMES Mar. 30, 
2013, at SR9. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Anthony Gardner, You’ve Been Verbed, THE ECONOMIST 1843 (2010), 
https://www.1843magazine.com/content/ideas/anthony-gardner/youve-been-
verbed. 
 58 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II act 2, sc. 3 ll. 86–87 (Anthony B. 
Dawson & Paul Yachin eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2011) (1597). 
 59 Gardner, supra note 57 (highlighting the dictionary’s inclusion of “access” 
and “reference” as verbs). 
 60 Brown, supra note 5, at 482. 
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turning of a noun or other type of speech into a verb.”61 One reason 
“verbing” is so popular is that it acts as a “vivid linguistic shortcut,” 
allowing people to quickly convey their meaning through vivid 
rhetorical images that are associated with the nouns.62 Instead of 
saying, “I shoved my way through the crowd by making use of my 
elbow,” one can simply say, “I elbowed through the crowd.”63 
“Verbing,” therefore, is a quick and innovative linguistic shortcut. 
Linguists have also noted that another reason for the popularity 
of “verbing,” especially in the trademark arena, is its usefulness in 
filling the “conversational vacuum” that occurs when innovative or 
new products come to the market.64 Furthermore, “when a business 
is the first to find widespread success and adoption of their service 
or product, they embed themselves in popular culture”65 and have a 
higher risk of being verbed. The internet and many of the 
technological advancements that accompany it are only a few 
decades old.66 Keeping this in mind, along with the understanding of 
how these technologies have become embedded into our daily lives, 
one can appreciate the struggle that internet trademark owners, like 
Google, face in trying to prevent verbing of their marks.67 
                                               
 61 Id. 
 62 Chi Luu, Do You Even Language Bro? Understanding Why Nouns Become 
Verbs, JSTOR DAILY (Mar. 9, 2016), https://daily.jstor.org/in-which-we-science-
why-nouns-become-verbs-because-language/. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Laura Heymann, Who Is the Reasonable Person? The Grammar of 
Trademarks, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1313, 1347 (2010). 
 65 Michael Pignataro, Powerful Brands: The Significance of Branding-Verbing, 
COREPHP, (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.corephp.com/blog/powerful-brands-the-
significance-of-brand-verbing/. 
 66 History of the Web, WORLD WIDE WEB FOUND., 
https://webfoundation.org/about/vision/history-of-the-web/ (last visited Sept. 16, 
2017). 
 67 Luu, supra note 62 (noting that invented creative verbs from proper nouns 
have become prolific especially among the internet). Although, as discussed in 
the next section, Twitter allows verb usage of its mark, many of the often-verbed 
brands strictly prohibit such usage. See Skype Trademark and Brand Guidelines, 
SKYPE, at 5, 
https://secure.skypeassets.com/content/dam/scom/pdf/skype_brand_guidelines.p
df (last visited Nov. 1, 2017) (emphasizing that “Skype” can only be used an 
adjective or a proper noun); TiVo Brand Guidelines, TIVO, at 4.1, 
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C. Examples of Lost Trademarks 
Traditionally, trademarks have been threatened when the public 
uses a brand name meant to be an adjective as a noun to identify the 
product for which the trademark is known. “Some famous marks 
that have lost their protection through genericide include aspirin, 
shredded wheat, and escalator. All of these terms started as source 
identifiers, but for various reasons became identified in the public’s 
mind with the type of products to which they were attached.”68 
Significantly, some of the classical examples of trademark 
genericide involved innovative technology or products that had not 
seen significant commercial use before being trademarked; thus, 
these product names helped fill the linguistic vacuum that their 
existence created, but at the expense of their trademark protections.69 
For example, in Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger,70 the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) held that the 
word “escalator,” though originally trademark protected, was no 
longer a valid trademark because in the public’s mind it had come 
to represent the product rather than the producer.71 In making this 
determination, the USPTO noted that the parties did not dispute that 
the word “escalator” was only recognized by the public as a moving 
stairway rather than the Otis Company’s trademark.72 It further 
pointed out that the company itself used the term generically in 
patent applications and advertisements, leading the USPTO to 
determine that such usage supported the conclusion that the 
company had abandoned its trademark.73 
In King-Seeley Thermos Co., the Second Circuit affirmed a 
district court’s determination that the trademark “THERMOS” had 
                                               
http://assets.tivo.com/assets/resources/TiVo_Brand_Guidelines_v3.3a.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2017) (emphasizing that “it is never permissible to use any of [its] 
trademarks as verbs”). 
 68 Brown, supra note 5, at 460. 
 69 See generally Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q 80 (1950) 
(escalator); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d 
Cir. 1963) (thermos). 
 70 85 U.S.P.Q. 80 (1950). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 80. 
 73 Id. 
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become a generic word for “vacuum-insulated” bottle because of the 
widespread use of the trademark as a stand-in for the product itself.74 
Although King-Seeley Thermos Co. had attempted after an initial 
period of advertising to market “THERMOS” as a descriptive 
trademark, the Court found there was ample support for the district 
court’s finding that the substantial majority of the public knew the 
term “thermos” as a vacuumed-sealed bottle without its trademark 
significance.75 The Court emphasized, however, that a mark having 
a dual meaning was not dispositive to the issue of genericness: 
[A] mark is not generic merely because it has some significance to the 
public as an indication of the nature or class of an article. In order to 
become generic[,] the principal significance of the word must be its 
indication of the nature or class of an article, rather than an indication of 
its origin.76 
While these cases pertain to trademarks falling to genericide 
because of the public’s use of them as nouns, modern technology 
trademark owners possibly have a greater problem in the public’s 
use of their trademarks as verbs. Xerox is a classic example of a 
modern technology trademark owner’s fight against verbing.77 The 
company’s 914-model was the first copier widely known to the 
American public.78 Consequently, the public began to use “xerox” 
as a general verb for photocopying.79 Out of fear of losing its 
trademark to genericide, Xerox launched an aggressive advertising 
campaign80 to educate the public about its brand and policed the use 
                                               
 74 King-Seeley Thermos Co., 321 F.2d at 578. 
 75 Id. at 579–80 (“The results of the survey (conducted at the behest of the 
defendant) were that about 75% [o]f adults in the United States who were familiar 
with containers that keep the contents hot or cold, call such a container a 
‘thermos’; about 12% [o]f the adult American public know that ‘thermos’ has a 
trade-mark significance, and about 11% [u]se the term ‘vacuum bottle’.”). 
 76 Id. at 580 (citation omitted). 
 77 When a Brand Name Becomes a Verb, BRANDMATTERS, 
https://brandmatters.com.au/blog/when-a-brand-name-becomes-a-verb (Feb. 4, 
2011) [hereinafter BRANDMATTERS]. 
 78 Brown, supra note 5, at 469. 
 79 Id. 
 80 This campaign sought to educate the public about the difference between 
Xerox’s brand name and the common name for the goods and services the 
company offered. Gary H. Fletcher & Elina Slavin, Practical Tips on Avoiding 
Genericide, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N (Nov. 15, 2011), 
46 N.C. J.L. & Tech. On. [VOL. 19: 33 
of its name by sending letters to those who “verbed” the brand even 
in noncommercial contexts.81 Although the un-capitalized “xerox” 
is now listed as a verb by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the 
corporation has refused to acknowledge the word’s dual meaning 
and has not given up its campaign to prevent verb-use of its 
trademark.82 Because of its efforts to educate the public and its 
aggressive policing of its mark, Xerox has not lost its trademark 
protections.83 
Xerox is not alone, however, in this battle-of-the-verbs; other 
modern technology trademark owners are now facing the problem 
of how to balance the public’s verbing of their brand with their 
desire to make their product ubiquitous in consumers’ daily lives. In 
a world where people regularly discuss their plans to “Netflix” and 
“Skype” all day, trademark owners straddle a fine line. Although 
Twitter, unlike Xerox, has accepted the verb-usage of its trademark, 
the company emphasizes that it must be used with a capital letter 
and reserves the right to enforce its guidelines through litigation.84 
Thus, even the more accepting trademark owners have expressed 
some wariness of the verb usage of their marks. 
Further, Twitter has shown its willingness to join the trademark 
battle by its drawn-out struggle to gain the rights to trademark the 
                                               
http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/PracticalTipsonAvoidingGenericide.as
px. An example of one of the ads used during the campaign is the following: “You 
can’t Xerox a Xerox on a Xerox. But we don’t mind at all if you copy a copy on 
a Xerox copier.” Id. For further examples of trademark advertising meant to 
educate the public, see Megan Garber, “Kleenex Is a Registered Trademark” (and 
Other Desperate Appeals), ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/09/kleenex-is-a-registered-
trademark-and-other-appeals-to-journalists/380733/. 
 81 Becky Peterson, This 1979 Letter to The New York Times Shows Just How 
Much Xerox Hates People Using Its Name as a Verb, BUS. INSIDER (July 27, 2017, 
5:05 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/old-letter-to-new-york-times-xerox-
takes-trademark-very-seriously-2017-7. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Brown, supra note 5, at 466–67. 
 84 Brand Guidelines, TWITTER, at 12–13, 
https://about.twitter.com/content/dam/about-twitter/company/brand-
resources/en_us/Twitter_Brand_Guidelines_V2.0.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 
2017). 
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term “Tweet.”85 Beginning in 2009, Twitter filed two applications to 
trademark the term but ran into complications because another 
company owned the trademark.86 After initiating a lawsuit against 
the company in 2011, Twitter negotiated with the company to 
acquire the mark.87 After the transfer, however, Twitter worried that 
its “Tweet” mark would be treated similarly to Xerox’s mark 
because of its verbing potential and eventually accepted verb use of 
the trademark in an attempt to control it.88 The aggressive 
negotiations Twitter used to gain the mark not only emphasize some 
of the problems innovative trademark owners face in establishing 
their brands, but also highlight the lengths they are willing to go to 
control their marks.89 Twitter is not alone, of course, in its struggle 
to control the verbing of its mark, and Google’s recent legal battle 
in the Ninth Circuit merely adds another chapter to this drawn-out 
story. 
                                               
 85 Amir Efrati, Twitter Will Get “Tweet” Trademark, Settles Lawsuit, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL BLOG, (Oct. 10, 2011, 8:17 PM), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/10/10/twitter-settles-lawsuit-over-”tweet”-
trademark/?mod=e2tw. 
 86 Twitter Gets Shut Out Once More, U.S. Trademark Office Won’t Grant Jack 
Dorsey Trademark for ‘Tweet’, NY DAILY NEWS (Mar. 20, 2011 4:00 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/gossip/twitter-shut-u-s-trademark-
office-won-grant-jack-dorsey-trademark-tweet-article-1.121949. Twittad, the 
company who beat out Twitter for the registration of the word “tweet,” provides 
“a service that matches Twitter users with advertisers to sell spaces on their 
profiles based on the number of followers they have.” Id. 
 87 Efrati, supra note 85. 
 88 Scott Martin, Is Twitter’s ‘Tweet’ Trademark at Risk?, USA TODAY (last 
updated Oct. 5, 2013, 11:51 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2013/10/04/is-twitters-tweet-trademark-at-
risk/2923269/ (noting that “tweet” is defined as a noun by the Mariam-Wester 
dictionary: “a post made on the Twitter online message service”); see also Brand 
Guidelines, supra note 84, at 12–13 (permitting use of “Twitter” and “Tweet” in 
noun and verb format but requiring that both terms be capitalized to emphasize 
their trademark significance and that they be used only in connection with 
Twitter’s “Tweet and “Retweet products”). 
 89 For a criticism of Twitter’s attempts to gain trademark protection for “Tweet” 
see Henry Blodget, Hey, Twitter, Enough of This Crap About “Here’s How You 
Can Use the Word Tweet,” BUS. INSIDER: TECH INSIDER (Oct. 30, 2010 9:36 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/twitter-trademarks-tweet. 
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III. ELLIOT V. GOOGLE, INC.: THE NINTH CIRCUIT UPHOLDS 
GOOGLE’S TRADEMARK 
In early 2012, Chris Gillespie, a man who is now famous for 
challenging Google’s mark, registered 763 domain names that 
included the word “google” with another specific brand, person, or 
product to create domain names such as “googlebarackobama.net” 
and “googledisney.com.”90 Although Gillespie claimed that he 
registered the domain names as part of an academic experiment to 
test a computer program he was developing to prevent cyber piracy, 
Google filed a complaint under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy.91 The company argued that Gillespie’s use of its 
trademark amounted to cybersquatting,92 which is the act of 
“registering, selling or using a domain name with the intent of 
profiting from the goodwill of someone else’s trademark.”93 
Gillespie claimed he chose the term “google” as a common 
denominator in all of the domain names because “google” was “both 
a generic term and a very highly searched term.”94 Google argued, 
and NAF agreed, that the domain names were confusingly similar to 
Google’s trademark and that Gillespie had registered them in bad 
faith.95 
Soon thereafter, David Elliot, a third-party beneficiary of 
Gillespie,96 filed a petition in an Arizona district court, seeking to 
cancel Google’s trademark under the Lanham Act,97 which Gillespie 
later joined.98 The petition argued that “google” had become 
synonymous with the act of searching on the internet and, thus, 
                                               
 90 Elliot v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 91 Yanni, supra note 4. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Cybersquatting: What Is It and What Can Be Done About It?, nolo.com, 
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/cybersquatting-what-what-can-be-
29778.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2017). 
 94 Yanni, supra note 4. 
 95 Elliot, 860 F.3d at 1154. 
 96 Sarah Mitroff, A Disgruntled Gentleman Honestly Thinks He Can Strip 
Google of Its Trademark, VENTUREBEAT, (May 25, 2012, 4:52 PM), 
https://venturebeat.com/2012/05/25/google-sued-over-trademark/. 
 97 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012). 
 98 Elliot, 860 F.3d at 1154–55. 
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qualified for cancellation under the Act because it was generic.99 
When both parties filed summary judgment motions on the issue of 
genericness, the Court sided with Google.100 It ruled that the relevant 
inquiry was not, as Elliot argued, whether “google” was most 
commonly used as a verb to denote the act of searching for 
something on the internet, but, instead, whether the public primarily 
understood the term “google” to be a generic word for search 
engines, and that Elliot failed to produce sufficient evidence to 
support this claim.101 
At trial, Elliot attempted to introduce two surveys to prove that 
Google’s mark was generic.102 The District Court refused to admit 
the first survey because it was conducted by Elliot’s counsel, 
Wirtz,103 and there was no evidence regarding its reliability or that it 
was made in accordance to generally accepted principles of survey 
making.104 The second survey Elliot offered at trial was a modified 
version of the Thermos Survey conducted by a survey expert who 
asked respondents, “If you were going to ask a friend to search for 
something on the Internet, what word or phrase would you use to 
tell him/her what you want him/her to do?”105 Just over half of the 
                                               
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. As will be discussed more in-depth later in this section, Elliot argued that 
trademarks can serve their purpose only if they are nouns and that “verb use 
automatically constitutes generic use.” Id. at 1158. 
 102 Elliot v. Google, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1167–71 (D. Ariz. 2014). 
 103 The Court noted that Wirtz did not have any expertise in survey 
interpretation as claimed at trial and was particularly concerned with the conflict 
of interest that would occur because Wirtz could not testify about the reliability 
of the survey and continue to be Elliot’s counsel. Id. Wirtz’s surveys prompted 
respondents to select among one of three answers to the prompt: “I most often use 
the word google to mean.” Id. at 1167. The answer that respondents could choose 
from were “to search something on the internet”; “the name of a specific search 
engine”; and “the internet (in general)”. Id. Of the 1,033 respondents for the first 
survey, 52.2% answered that they most often used “google” to mean to search for 
something on the internet. Id. 
 104 Id. at 1168; see FED. R. EVID. 702(c)-(d) (establishing that expert opinions 
must be based on reliable methods and principles to be admissible). 
 105 Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1168–69. This question was the only question in the 
survey. Id. at 1169. As the district court pointed out, Thermos Surveys typically 
ask several questions, and this survey did not test the primary significance of the 
term to consumers or whether it was generic with respect to search engines. Id. 
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251 respondents answered using the word “google.”106 Although it 
admitted the second survey, the district court found this evidence 
unpersuasive because it did not address the dispositive issue of 
whether the primary significance of the term to the consuming 
public was a generic word used to indicate search engines in 
general.107 
The Court also noted that Elliot produced no evidence that any 
dictionary had defined the term “google” without referencing its 
trademark significance and that none of Google’s competitors used 
the term generically to refer to their products.108 Instead, all that 
Elliot offered as additional support for his claim was that the media 
sometimes used the term generically and that the co-founder of 
Google once used the word generically.109 In ruling that Elliot had 
not met his burden, the Court specifically addressed the semantic 
issue of whether verb usage alone could be a dispositive factor in 
determining whether a term was indeed generic.110 It stated, “[t]he 
Court declines Plaintiffs’ invitation to judicially legislate federal 
trademark law out [of] its ‘dark ages’ by sidestepping the statutory 
test for primary significance and holding that frequency of verb use 
is in and of itself sufficient to render a mark generic.”111 
In his appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Elliot argued that the district 
court misapplied the standard of the primary significance test by 
framing the inquiry as whether the public primarily thought of the 
                                               
 106 Id. at 1169. Specifically, 129 of the respondents used the word “google” in 
some way to answer the question. Id. 
 107 Id. at 1170. Google also offered survey evidence in the form of a Teflon 
Survey, which asked 420 respondents identify six names as either brands or as 
common names. Id. at 1166. Although not told that “both” was an acceptable 
answer, some respondents said that some of the names listed were both. Id. 
“Excluding 19 respondents who answered they do not conduct searches on the 
internet, 93.77% of the respondents identified “Google” as a brand name, and only 
5.25% identified Google as a common name.” Id. 
 108 Id. at 1171–73. What the court means when referring to Google’s 
competitor’s use is that Microsoft and Yahoo do not call their search engines a 
“google.” Instead, they have their own brand names for their search engines—
Bing and Yahoo! Search, respectively. 
 109 Id. For a more in-depth discussion of Larry Page’s statement for google users 
to “keep googling,” see infra Part IV. 
 110 Id. at 1174. 
 111 Id. 
DEC. 2017] Battle of the Verbs 51 
term “google” as a generic term for search engines.112 Instead, he 
argued, the Court should have framed the inquiry as whether the 
public primarily used the word “google” as a noun identifying 
Google’s trademark or as a verb for the action of searching on the 
internet.113 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with this argument for two 
reasons: (1) the argument “fail[ed] to recognize that a claim of 
genericide must always relate to a particular type of good or 
service,” and (2) it made the assumption that verb usage constitutes 
generic use.114 
First, the Court held that Elliot’s criticisms of the district court’s 
framing of the inquiry were unfounded because “the district court 
properly recognized the necessary and inherent link between a claim 
of genericide and a particular type of good or service.”115 To support 
this conclusion, the Court pointed to the language of the Lanham 
Act that allows a party to request cancellation of a trademark “when 
it becomes the generic name for the goods or services . . . for which 
it is registered.”116 The Court did not address its reasons for believing 
why “google” must generically refer to search engines rather than 
the act of conducting searches through a search engine as Elliot 
suggested. Its reasoning, however, appeared to be grounded in the 
district court’s determination that the contested Google 
trademarks117 dealt specifically with Google’s search engine rather 
than the act of searching things on the internet.118 
The Court further noted the Lanham Act designated the standard 
for cancellation of a trademark to be the primary significance of the 
trademark protected term and focused on whether the trademark had 
                                               
 112 Elliot v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 1157. 
 116 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012)) (emphasis and alteration in 
original). 
 117 Elliot contested two of Google’s trademarks. Elliot v. Google, Inc., 45 F. 
Supp. 3d 1156, 1159 (D. Ariz. 2014). The marks numbered 2884502 and 2806075 
cover “computer software for creating indexes of information” and services that 
provided this software to create personalized information respectively. Id. 
(citation omitted). In short, the trademarks cover the search engine itself rather 
than the consumer’s act accomplished through the search engine. Id. 
 118 Elliot, 860 F.3d at 1157 (referencing Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1159). 
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become the generic name for certain goods or services that it 
offered.119 Such a requirement, the Court held, “recognize[d] that a 
term may be unprotectable with regard to one type of good, and 
protectable with regard to another type of good.”120 
Second, the Court chose not to focus on the traditional advice 
regarding the grammatical use of trademarks when determining 
whether Google’s mark was generic.121 Instead, it held that Elliot’s 
argument that trademarks can only be valid when used as an 
adjective to be a “semantic argument [that] contradict[ed] 
fundamental principles underlying the protectability of 
trademarks.”122 In doing so, the Court pointed to the legislative intent 
behind the Lanham Act, in which Congress specifically 
acknowledged that a person could use a trademark as a product, i.e. 
as a noun, while still keeping the source of that product in mind.123 
The Court also pointed to its prior decision in Coca-Cola v. 
Overland, Inc.124 to support its conclusion, where the Ninth Circuit 
                                               
 119 Id. For an example of a trademark deemed generic because its primary 
significance to the public was the product rather than the producer, see Bayer Co. 
v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). In Bayer, the Southern District 
of New York determined that the trademark Aspirin had become generic and 
passed into the public domain because people buying the product associated the 
term “aspirin” as a name for the medicine rather than the company producing the 
medicine. Id. at 510–512; see also Bill Donahue, Before Google, These 5 Brands 
Fought Against ‘Genericide’, LAW360 (May 24, 2017 9:32 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/927986 (providing more examples of products 
that fought genericide). 
 120 Elliot, 860 F.3d at 1157. 
 121 See generally Danica Mathes, Lessons from Google Surviving the 
Genericide Attack, Law360 (July 7, 2017, 11:48 AM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/938665/lessons-from-google-surviving-the-
genericide-attack (listing traditional “dos” and “don’ts” to establish trademark 
boundaries, including not using the trademark as a verb or a noun and using it as 
an adjective to qualify the product’s generic name); see also 2 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12.26 
(5th ed. 2017) (noting the importance of designating a generic term with a 
trademark, i.e. using the trademark as adjective, in preventing generic use of the 
trademark). 
 122 Elliot, 860 F.3d at 1157. 
 123 Id. at 1157–58. 
 124 Coca-Cola v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1255 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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held that “Coke” was not a generic term.125 In Overland, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the use of “Coke” as a general term for soda did not 
prove the trademark’s genericness because it failed to prove that the 
customers did not think of Coca-Cola as the source of the soda.126 
The Court held that in the same way a purchaser might use the noun 
“Coke” in an indiscriminate way to refer to soda in general, without 
subjecting Coca-Cola’s trademark to genericide, so too could an 
internet user use the term “google” as an indiscriminate verb without 
Google losing its trademark for such use.127 
The Court noted that focusing on whether the mark had come to 
represent the product itself, in this case search engines, was a 
requirement “necessary to maintain the viability of arbitrary marks 
as a protectable trademark category.”128 It also emphasized that if 
Elliot’s theory that verb use alone could cause genericide was 
correct, there would be no need to inquire into the consumer’s inner 
thought process.129 Not doing so would contradict the purpose of 
applying the primary significance test.130 In making this distinction, 
the Court upheld a trademark that obviously retains its trademark 
significance and gave popular trademark owners a reason to breathe 
a little easier while still managing to uphold the goals of trademark 
law. 
IV. ELLIOT V. GOOGLE, INC.: A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Elliot v. Google, Inc., although 
grounded in basic trademark principles, accounts for the evolving 
nature of language and accurately reflects the main goals of 
trademark law. More court decisions consistent with this opinion 
could help alleviate the tension and needless litigation that comes 
from such usage when it is obvious the brand still holds its 
significance. 
                                               
 125 Elliot, 860 F.3d at 1158 (citing Coca-Cola, 692 F.2d at 1255). 
 126 Coca-Cola, 692 F.2d at 1255. 
 127 Elliot, 860 F.3d at 1158. 
 128 Id. at 1157. 
 129 Id. at 1158. 
 130 Id. at 1157–58. Because the primary significance test is focused on how the 
consumer perceives the product, it is essential to discover what the consumer 
thinks about the product. Id.  
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A. The Decision Accounts for the Evolution of Language 
When rejecting Elliot’s argument that trademarks must be 
adjectives in order to be valid, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[i]f Elliott 
were correct that a trademark can only perform its source-
identifying function when it is used as an adjective, then we would 
not have cited a need for evidence regarding the customers’ inner 
thought processes.”131 By applying the primary significance test to 
Google’s trademark, the Court rejected the semantic dogma that has 
plagued popular trademark owners for years, namely that the 
public’s use rather than their perception of the trademark was the 
most important factor in determining whether a mark is generic.132 
The Court held the popularity of “googling” does not make 
Google’s mark generic, acknowledging that language is not static 
and applicable to only one situation; thus, it can be considered a step 
toward easing some of the tension between traditional trademark 
practices and modern language use. As one author points out, 
current trademark laws encourage trademark owners to think of the 
enforcement of their trademarks as “akin to thwarting adverse 
possession: [t]he trademark’s inviolability must be defended against 
any and all encroachments, lest the right to own the mark be 
relinquished to those who are using it for some personal benefit.”133 
These aggressive tactics are understandable when one considers 
what is at stake. Under the “once generic, always generic” theory, 
trademarks killed by genericide cannot be revived even by another 
evolution in the English language.134 Thus, “[g]enericide poses the 
ultimate threat, as it can reduce the value of the billion-dollar mark 
to zero.”135 Had the Ninth Circuit ruled otherwise, it could have 
                                               
 131 Id. at 1158 (referring to the Court’s decision in Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, 
Inc., 692 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
 132 Id. (“We have already acknowledged that a customer might use the noun 
“coke” in an indiscriminate sense, with no particular cola beverage in mind; or in 
a discriminate sense, with a Coca-Cola beverage in mind. In the same way, we 
now recognize that an internet user might use the verb “google” in an 
indiscriminate sense, with no particular search engine in mind; or in a discriminate 
sense, with the Google search engine in mind.”). 
 133 Heymann, supra note 64, at 1318. 
 134 Desai & Rierson, supra note 15, at 1849. 
 135 Id. at 1797. 
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turned Google’s mark, worth billions,136 into a very expensive 
trademark disaster. 
Further, although there is undoubtedly some benefit in having 
trademark owners actively managing their brands, applying strict 
rules to trademark language can lead to undesirable consequences—
such as one of the most valuable and recognized brands in the world 
arguing against genericide over mere semantics.137 “If trademark law 
does indeed purport to reflect how the reasonable consumer acts in 
the marketplace, that reflection should incorporate the fact that 
language variation is an inherent characteristic of the English 
language.”138 Thus, “verbing” should be recognized for the common 
linguistic practice that it is, and other federal circuits should follow 
the Ninth Circuit in acknowledging that its use does not necessitate 
the conclusion that a trademark is generic. By explicitly refusing to 
decide the case on verb usage alone, the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
implicitly creates room for language to evolve naturally without 
necessarily having deadly consequences for the trademarks that 
inevitably rest on this language. 
B. The Decision Reflects the Goals of Trademark Law 
In addition to acknowledging the fluidity of language, the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision reflects the twin goals of trademark law: (1) 
encouraging the production of quality products and (2) reducing 
customers’ cost of shopping and making purchase decisions.139 
“[T]rademarks reduce the buyer’s cost of collecting information 
about goods and services by narrowing the scope of information into 
brand segments rather than have the buyer start a new search process 
with each purchase.”140 By doing so, trademarks ensure that, with 
                                               
 136 The World’s Most Valuable Brands, FORBES, 
https://www.forbes.com/powerful-brands/list/#tab:rank (last viewed Sept. 19, 
2017) (listing Google as the second most valuable brand in the world with a 
reported worth of $101.8 billion). 
 137 Id. 
 138 Heymann, supra note 64, at 1329; see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 121, 
§ 12:8 (“Buyers or users of a product may sometimes use a trademark in a generic 
sense in casual conversation even though when questioned, those persons are fully 
aware of the trademark significance of the term.”) 
 139 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 121, § 2.5. 
 140 Id. 
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minimal effort, the consumer can get the quality of the product to 
which they have grown accustomed.141 
If the Ninth Circuit had held verb usage of a brand alone 
constitutes genericide, as Elliot argued it should, the Court would 
have eroded these principal protections. Elliot offered no real 
evidence that the use of the term “google” as a verb in any way 
eroded Google’s significance as a trademark to the public.142 As the 
Arizona District Court pointed out, the evidence Elliot offered, if 
taken for its full weight, only supported the conclusion that the 
majority of the public used “google” as a verb to mean conducting 
internet searches.143 It did not support any inference that the primary 
significance of Google to the consuming public was to represent 
search engines in general.144 In fact, no company’s trademark has 
ever been canceled under the Lanham Act solely because of the verb 
usage of its trademark.145 Because terms, including trademarks, can 
have dual significance in the English language, canceling a 
trademark solely because it has become ubiquitous enough to be 
verbed would likely run contrary to the goals of trademark law by 
confusing consumers who, although they use the trademark 
indiscriminately as a verb, have come to expect the term to have 
brand-significance in certain contexts. 
The Teflon Survey used by Google as evidence that its brand 
was not generic demonstrates this point. Even though respondents 
were not told that they could identify the queried terms as both 
common names and brand names, some of the respondents still 
listed the terms as both.146 These respondents’ refusals to list the 
proffered brands merely as one category or another demonstrates 
that consumers can separate a brand name from its generic form 
                                               
 141 Id. 
 142 Elliot v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Elliot cannot 
survive summary judgment based on ‘sheer quantity’ of irrelevant evidence. We 
agree with the district court that, at best, Elliot has presented admissible evidence 
to support the inference that a majority of the relevant public uses the verb 
“google” in a generic sense. Because this alone cannot support a claim of 
genericide, the district court properly granted summary judgment for Google.”). 
 143 Elliot v. Google, Inc. 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1170 (D. Ariz. 2014). 
 144 Id. 
 145 Brown, supra note 5, at 483–84. 
 146 Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1166. 
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depending on the context. By refusing to acknowledge this 
dichotomy and taking this usage out of context, courts would likely 
create greater confusion among consumers who have come to rely 
on these trademarks to ensure that they get the quality of product to 
which they are accustomed. 
Everyone loves knock-offs at discounted prices, but no one 
wants to pay for a knock-off if he or she is trying to purchase the 
original. Similarly, if Google were to lose its trademark protections, 
different companies offering similar “google” products could crop 
up, creating mass confusion and potential disappointment for 
consumers trying to buy legitimate Google services. This could 
create confusion and disappointment among consumers if they 
unknowingly attribute an inferior product to Google. 
Further, such a holding would be a slap in the face to trademark 
owners whose marketing techniques have made their brands 
household names. Although the genericide doctrine has been used 
to prevent companies from monopolizing brands that no longer have 
trademark significance, trademark law also serves to protect 
trademark owners who have worked hard to ensure their brands have 
legitimate significance.147 For Google, this could mean that the 
company’s successful marketing strategies over the last couple of 
decades would reduce its brands value to rubble,148 and the many 
consumers who have come to rely on Google as a source of their 
technological services would be faced with trying to discern their 
beloved brand from the many companies piggy-backing on 
Google’s success while offering an inferior product. 
This could also spell disaster for those who advertise on Google 
and use the brand’s popularity to endorse their own products.149 
                                               
 147 Brown, supra note 5, at 477–78. 
 148 See Desai & Rierson, supra note 15, at 1796–97 (noting that a company’s 
brand “may be its most valuable asset,” and that “[g]enericide poses the ultimate 
threat, as it can reduce the value of a billion-dollar mark to zero.”). 
 149 Currently, if a person is shopping around for shoes, ads will pop up in later 
browsing sessions from companies like Zappos, Belk, and other shoe retailers, 
offering similar style shoes to what that person was looking for originally. This is 
a feature of Google’s Adword, and it can apply to any search done through 
Google. For more information on Google’s Adword, see Chuck Topinka, How 
Does Exactly Google’s Adword Work?, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2014, 12:04 PM), 
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Currently, Google offers a wide range of advertising options for 
business owners and other organizations who wish to advertise with 
the company on various platforms150 and on varying budgets.151 In 
2016, Google made a reported $19.1 billion from ad revenues.152 If 
the company’s brand was to be ruled generic merely because it is 
popular enough to be verbed, not only would Google stand to lose 
serious money,153 the small businesses, startups, and other 
companies who use Google as a way to promote their ideas and 
products would lose valuable time and money in the process. 
Such a holding would also fail to acknowledge the changes that 
the internet has brought to the way trademark owners must market 
their brands in order to make them successful. Far from sticking with 
the traditional trademark precepts regarding marketing, modern 
trademark owners, especially those with technology-related 
trademarks, are encouraged by some advisors to “verb” their 
marks.154 For example, one advisor advocated that trademark owners 
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affected Google’s trademark protection in its other numerous trademarks and 
logos, many of these trademarks are in combination with its base “google” 
trademark to create, for example, “Google Chrome.” Further, even though Google 
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use “verbing” as a way to integrate their products with the public’s 
daily lives: 
The first question a marketer should ask when looking at a brand 
assignment is: What can the brand do to translate its attributes into 
actions? What behaviors can the brand take to reach its marketing goals? 
What can the brand do to make itself more relevant, integral, helpful or 
entertaining to its audience? A simple acid test: Show me, don’t snow 
me. 
It’s not surprising that, in a world of increasing transparency, actions 
speak louder than words. Brands need to act thoughtfully, tangibly and 
honestly to live the promises they make . . . not just talk about them. 
They need to verb.155 
Although her advice varies greatly from the traditional advice of 
presenting one’s trademark in adjective form only, it has a common-
sense ring to it when it comes to marketing: make something so 
ubiquitous to people’s everyday lives that it literally becomes a part 
of their vocabulary, and you have hit marketing gold. In fact, from 
a marketing perspective, the brand’s popularity has reached an 
ultimate high if a trademark becomes so ubiquitous that it is verbed, 
despite the risk of genericide.156 
Further, because the internet has changed the pace at which 
brands become popular,157 some trademark owners are less 
concerned with their brands being considered generic as they are 
with them falling obsolete.158 If the company is the first to find 
widespread success and adoption of its products, that company and 
its products are often embedded into pop culture.159 Thus, advice like 
that above, although risky, is hard for technology companies to 
ignore. For example, in the late 2000s, Microsoft’s chief executive 
Steve Ballmer said that he liked the name “Bing” for the company’s 
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search engine because it “worked globally” and had the potential “to 
verb up.”160 Despite the trademark implications, Ballmer hoped that 
people would “bing it” rather than “google it”—a desire which has 
probably changed given Google’s recent legal battles. 
Even Google at one point embraced the verbing of its brand. Part 
of Elliot’s argument before the Ninth Circuit regarding the 
trademark’s genericness was that the company itself had used the 
brand generically as a verb.161 Specifically, he cited to a “Google 
Friends Newsletter” in which Google’s co-founder Larry Page told 
people to “have fun and keep googling!”162 The Ninth Circuit 
pointed out, however, that this evidence fell short of showing any 
generic use on Google’s part because it did not demonstrate whether 
Larry Page had Google’s search engine in mind when making the 
statement.163 The Ninth Circuit’s decision, although not explicit in 
acknowledging internet marketing realities, does help alleviate the 
tension created by these conflicting interests and gives internet 
trademark owners more leeway in promoting their brands. 
C. Possible Changes to Trademark Law 
To reconcile trademark laws with evolving language principles 
and internet marketing realities, more federal circuits must follow 
the Ninth Circuit’s finding that “verbing” alone does not destroy a 
trademark’s primary significance to public consumers. Although no 
United States courts have ruled that a trademark is generic within 
the meaning of the Lanham Act based solely on the public’s use of 
it as a verb,164 the threat of one doing so still lingers. As long as 
courts continue to focus on the semantic use of the trademark as 
evidence of its generic nature, trademark owners will continue to be 
aggressive in their protection tactics. 
In his concurrence in Elliot, Judge Watford emphasized that 
courts should not completely disregard verb usage, arguing that 
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indiscriminate verb use of a trademark could potentially be relevant 
in determining if a trademark is generic.165 He argued that verb usage 
would be relevant to the inquiry if the evidence showed that the 
public used the “verbed” trademark to represent the product as a 
species rather than the act accomplished by using the product.166 
While this is possibly true, it is hard to see how the “verbed” 
trademark would come to represent the product species itself unless 
language further evolves to make such use practical. One generally 
turns nouns into verbs to quickly get a point across. It is hard to 
imagine one using a verb to represent a noun, which is what must 
occur if verbing is to represent the product species as a whole. 
Perhaps a better way to understand Judge Watford’s point is to 
consider, for example, a person who uses Google’s Hangout to 
“Skype” someone long distance.167 Because the products have many 
similarities,168 unsophisticated users (and even those more familiar 
with the latest technology) may not realize the distinction between 
the two and use the latter when referring to the former. If evidence 
were to show that the majority of the public considered “Skype” to 
be any system used to make a video call regardless of the company 
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that produced it, Skype could lose its trademark because the primary 
significance of the trademark would be the generic product rather 
than Skype as the producer.169 Thus, people who say that they 
“Skyped” someone, but, in reality, used Google Hangout without 
realizing that there was a difference in the two systems, would put 
Skype’s trademark at risk. 
Although the concurring opinion makes a good case for not 
systematically ruling out verb usage in genericide determinations, 
courts can still alleviate the negative effects aggressive trademark 
policies have by shifting the focus of verb usage to the proper 
context, namely the commercial arena. As some scholars argue, 
courts consider too broad a scope of evidence when determining 
whether a trademark has fallen victim to genericide.170 They argue 
that non-competitive uses, such as dictionary entries and media use, 
are not truly indicative of what constitutes a term’s “primary 
significance” to the consumer in the commercial context and that 
courts should focus instead on its use in its relevant marketplace.171 
As they put it: 
[U]se of a trademark as a common noun or verb, in a noncommercial 
context, does not have the same direct impact on a mark’s source-
identifying capacity as does an infringing use by the trademark holder’s 
competitor. Such noncommercial uses typically indicate that mark is 
functioning in a hybrid fashion (a fate that is practically inevitable for 
the most famous trademarks).172 
Because courts continue, however, to consider noncommercial uses 
of trademarks as evidence of genericide, trademark owners continue 
to feel the need to police even the fair use of their marks through 
threats of litigation and a constant stream of cease and desist 
letters.173 
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One can argue, however, that eliminating all noncommercial 
uses of trademarks may be tipping the scale too much in favor of 
trademark owners who already have a significant advantage over 
their competitors. While the evidence should appropriately focus on 
the consumer’s perception in a commercial setting, dictionary and 
media use does demonstrate, on some level, an understanding of the 
general public and, thus, should not be discounted completely. 
A Teflon survey, like the one offered by Google, is a good way 
to determine if a brand is actually generic because it seeks to discern 
whether the public recognizes a trademark as a brand or common 
name.174 If properly conducted surveys reveal that the majority of 
the public does not recognize the trademark significance of the 
brand, then the mark is not fulfilling its identifying duty and should 
properly be deemed generic.175 If these surveys do reveal a majority 
of brand recognition, the trademarks are fulfilling their 
identification purpose and should not be considered generic just 
because of the public’s fair use of them.176 
Further, judicial balancing of the different uses—putting more 
weight on competitor’s use and consumer’s perception—would be 
a more nuanced way to determine whether a trademark has fallen to 
genericide and would allow trademark owners more room in 
advertising their mark. Such judicial balancing would recognize that 
a company like Twitter, who permits verb usage of its mark, is still 
taking lengths to acquire and protect its marks despite its flexibility 
in grammar. This balancing, although surely not eliminating the 
preventive measures of wary trademark owners, would allow 
trademark owners to better balance the competing interests of 
marketing and protecting their brands while also acknowledging that 
language is not concrete property to be only used one way. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Elliot v. Google, Inc. to uphold 
Google’s trademark under the primary significance test may have 
come as no shock to anyone given the massive popularity the 
company has earned throughout the world. The Court’s decision, 
however, to hold that verb usage of a trademark alone does not 
necessitate a trademark’s death by genericide is important in many 
respects. 
First, the decision acknowledges that language cannot be fixed 
in time and that, in order to allow its natural progression, words must 
be viewed in context to discern their meaning. The term “google” 
may be used by the public as a verb for the act of searching for 
information on the internet; however, as the Ninth Circuit’s opinion 
acknowledges, that does not mean that the public does not recognize 
Google’s significance as a trademark in a commercial context. To 
hold otherwise would place artificial barriers on the public’s use of 
language and would undoubtedly make already aggressive 
trademark enforcement policies even more so. 
Second, the decision accurately reflects the goals of trademark 
law and the realities of internet and technology marketing strategies. 
Because words have dual meanings, and consumers may still 
recognize a term’s trademark significance despite using it as a verb, 
a court’s ruling that verb usage alone makes a trademark generic 
would do little to reflect the goals of trademark law. In fact, doing 
so would likely make it more difficult for consumers to discern the 
product they have learned to trust from inferior ones marketed by 
companies attempting to capitalize on the trademark’s success. 
Further, the internet has accelerated the pace at which brands 
gain a reputation and a following. Internet trademark owners are 
currently forced to walk the thin line of integrating their brands into 
popular culture while still retaining their trademark rights. The 
Ninth Circuit’s decision, however, makes this decision easier by 
refusing to place special significance on the syntax of the trademark 
but instead focus solely on the primary significance of the term to 
the public. 
While courts should not eliminate verb usage in their analysis of 
whether a trademark has become generic, they should place a greater 
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emphasis on its use in commercial contexts rather than on the 
public’s fair use. Although doing so will probably not be enough to 
encourage all trademark owners to cease their aggressive trademark 
policies, the overall effect would hopefully be to discourage the 
obvious cybersquatting that occurred in this case and to reduce the 
amount of pointless litigation and cease and desist letters that stem 
from the public’s fair use of the trademark. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision is a victory for the consumer and the trademark owner 
alike, in that the former can continue to “google” or “xerox” to their 
hearts’ content while the latter is less galvanized to prevent such use. 
 
